

BUDGET TABLES: SENATOR ERNEST F. HOLLINGS

Year	Government bud- get (outlays in bil- lions)	Trust funds	Unified deficit	Real deficit	Gross Federal debt	Gross interest
1968	178.1	3.1	-25.2	-28.3	368.7	14.6
1969	183.6	-0.3	+3.2	+2.9	368.8	16.6
1970	195.6	12.3	-2.8	-15.1	380.9	19.3
1971	210.2	4.3	-23.0	-27.3	408.2	21.0
1972	230.7	4.3	-23.4	-27.7	435.9	21.8
1973	245.7	15.5	-14.9	-30.4	466.3	24.2
1974	269.4	11.5	-6.1	-17.6	483.9	29.3
1975	332.3	4.8	-53.2	-58.0	541.9	32.7
1976	371.8	13.4	-73.7	-87.1	629.0	37.1
1977	409.2	23.7	-53.7	-77.4	706.4	41.9
1978	458.7	11.0	-59.2	-70.2	776.6	48.7
1979	504.0	12.2	-40.7	-52.9	829.5	59.9
1980	590.9	5.8	-73.8	-79.6	909.1	74.8
1981	678.2	6.7	-79.0	-85.7	994.8	95.5
1982	745.8	14.5	-128.0	-142.5	1,137.3	117.2
1983	808.4	26.6	-207.8	-234.4	1,371.7	128.7
1984	851.8	7.6	-185.4	-193.0	1,564.7	153.9
1985	946.4	40.6	-212.3	-252.9	1,817.6	178.9
1986	990.3	81.8	-221.2	-303.0	2,120.6	190.3
1987	1,003.9	75.7	-149.8	-225.5	2,346.1	195.3
1988	1,064.1	100.0	-155.2	-255.2	2,601.3	214.1
1989	1,143.2	114.2	-152.5	-266.7	2,868.0	240.9
1990	1,252.7	117.2	-221.4	-338.6	3,206.6	264.7
1991	1,323.8	122.7	-269.2	-391.9	3,598.5	285.5
1992	1,380.9	113.2	-290.4	-403.6	4,002.1	292.3
1993	1,408.2	94.2	-255.1	-349.3	4,351.4	292.5
1994	1,460.6	89.1	-203.2	-292.3	4,643.7	296.3
1995	1,518.0	121.9	-161.4	-283.3	4,927.0	336.0
1996 est.	1,575.6	121.8	-189.3	-311.1	5,238.0	348.0

Source: CBO's "1995 Economic and Budget Outlook: An Update," August 1995.

[In billion of dollars]	Year 2002
1996 Budget:	
Kasich Conf. Report, p.3 (Defi- cit)	-108
1996 Budget Outlays (CBO est.)	1,575.6
1995 Budget Outlays	1,518.0
Increased spending	+57.6
CBO baseline assuming budget resolution:	
Outlays	1,876
Revenues	1,883
This assumes:	
(1) Extending discretionary freeze 1999-2002	-91
(2) Spending cuts	-235
(3) Using SS Trust Fund	-109
Total needed	-435

Mr. FEINGOLD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is 10 minutes for the proponents and 10 minutes for the opponents.

Who yields time?

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I assume the proponents as being those seeking cloture?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct.

Mr. FEINGOLD. What is the amount of time for the opponents?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. There are 10 minutes on each side.

Mr. FEINGOLD. I ask the Senator from Connecticut, through the Chair, if he would yield me time to speak in opposition to the motion.

Mr. DODD. It is my understanding that the time remaining is equally divided.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.

Mr. DODD. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Wisconsin.

Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the Helms bill on Cuba. As I have said on the floor several times before, it advances the wrong policy at the wrong time.

Fidel Castro is finally, reluctantly, finding that his government must accept the realities of the 1990's: that free trade and political liberalization are

fundamental to the promotion of enlightened self-interest. As we have seen time and again, once a people have tasted the fruit of freedoms they invariably demand the only atmosphere in which free markets and human rights flourish. That, of course, is democracy and a government protective of a phalanx of rights: the free exchange of ideas and information; respect for human rights; the right to seek one's livelihood unhindered by government fiat. We are seeing the first tentative steps toward an emerging market economy in Cuba; the first steps, we can all agree and hope, which point towards and end of this dictatorship.

So I find it ironic that at the very moment when the United States is presented with the best opportunity in nearly four decades to encourage and influence the move toward positive change in Cuba, the Senator seeks to legislate that opportunity out of existence. Rather than encourage the Cuban Government to move into the 1990's, the Helms bill would have it slide back into the 1960's, dragging the administration as well into continuing and, indeed, strengthening a fossilized policy of isolation that did not work even when, it could be argued, a bipolar world justified such short-term thinking.

In fact, rather than seek to promote the kind of positive change administrations, Republican and Democratic, have sought for decades, and which at long last holds out the promise to lift the Cuban people out of the misery visited on them by Castro's totalitarian regime, the Helms bill, incredibly, would increase their pain by further isolating Cuba. It is wishful thinking—nearly 40 years of wishful thinking—that a tightened embargo will provide the final push leading to the downfall of the Castro regime. We can be certain, rather, that Castro will put this pain to good effect: if the history of recent Cuban-American relations has

taught us anything, it is that to this day Castro can still rally a proud people against the bogeyman of Yanqui imperialism.

But Senator HELMS' bill does not stop at increasing the hardship of Cuba's people. It seeks to impose on other nations—close allies in many cases—extraterritorial provisions which conflict with international law and various treaties to which the United States is party. I note that the embargo is already considered by many of our allies to be a hopelessly out-dated affront to their sovereignty: the HELMS proposal will only lead to retaliation at a time when we seek their cooperation on issues of greater complexity and, frankly, of more immediate import to our national interests.

I would add, as well, that our Latin American friends see efforts such as the Helms bill as a vestige of the gunboat diplomacy which, to this day, leaves them wary of our intentions. But it is not enough that this bill would hurt the average Cuban, enrage our allies, and renew the suspicions of our Latin American friends. It would also strike at the American taxpayer. Senator HELMS would have the administration seek—in vain, in my opinion—to expand TV Marti, a failed program which figuratively and literally crashed in a Florida swamp. The Cuban people have not seen the truth from TV Marti, because they never see TV Marti.

Rather, the truth is more likely to come to them as Cuba gains more access to international television, engages in dialogs about the rest of the world, and integrates into the international community. Therefore, we should encourage policies and dialogs which will lead to the political changes and freedoms sought by the Cuban people.

The administration's October 5 announcement that it will seek to put in place measures designed to promote the flow of information into and out of